Peer Effects in the Workplace by Cornelissen, T et al.
American Economic Review 2017, 107(2): 425–456 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141300
425
Peer Effects in the Workplace†
By Thomas Cornelissen, Christian Dustmann, and Uta Schönberg*
Existing evidence on peer effects in the productivity of coworkers stems 
from either laboratory experiments or  real-world studies referring to 
a specific firm or occupation. In this paper, we aim at providing more 
generalizable results by investigating a large local labor market, 
with a focus on peer effects in wages rather than productivity. Our 
estimation strategy—which links the average permanent productivity 
of workers’ peers to their wages—circumvents the reflection problem 
and accounts for endogenous sorting of workers into peer groups 
and firms. On average over all occupations, and in the type of high-
skilled occupations investigated in studies on knowledge spillover, 
we find only small peer effects in wages. In the type of low-skilled 
occupations analyzed in extant studies on social pressure, in contrast, 
we find larger peer effects, about one-half the size of those identified 
in similar studies on productivity. (JEL J24, J31, J41, M12, M54)
The communication and social interaction between coworkers that necessarily 
occur in the workplace facilitate comparison of individual versus coworker produc-
tivity. In this context, workers whose productivity falls behind that of coworkers, or 
falls short of a social norm, may experience personal feelings of guilt or shame. They 
may then act on these feelings by increasing their own efforts, a mechanism referred 
to in the economic literature as “peer pressure.” Social interaction in the workplace 
may also lead to “knowledge spillover” in which coworkers learn from each other 
and build up skills that they otherwise would not have. Such productivity enhanc-
ing peer effects may exacerbate initial productivity differences between workers 
and increase  long-term inequality when high-quality workers cluster together in the 
same peer groups. Moreover, while knowledge spillover is an important source of 
agglomeration economies (e.g., Lucas 1988; Marshall 1890), social pressure further 
implies that workers respond not only to monetary but also to social incentives, 
which may alleviate the potential  free-rider problem inherent whenever workers 
work together in a team (Kandel and Lazear 1992).
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Despite the economic importance of peer effects, empirical evidence on such 
effects in the workplace is as yet restricted to a handful of studies referring to very 
specific settings, based on either laboratory experiments or on  real-world data from 
a single firm or occupation. For instance, Mas and Moretti’s (2009) study of one 
large supermarket chain provides persuasive evidence that workers’ productivity 
increases when they work alongside more productive coworkers, a finding that they 
attribute to increased social pressure. Likewise, a controlled laboratory experiment 
by Falk and Ichino (2006) reveals that students recruited to stuff letters into enve-
lopes work faster when they share a room than when they sit alone.1 For peer effects 
in the workplace induced by knowledge spillover, however, the evidence is mixed. 
Whereas Waldinger (2012) finds little evidence for knowledge spillover among 
scientists in the same department in a university, Azoulay, Graff Zivin, and Wang 
(2010) and Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) find support for learning from cowork-
ers among medical science researchers and teachers, respectively.2 In a comprehen-
sive  meta-analysis of peer effects in coworker productivity covering both high- and 
 low-skilled tasks, Herbst and Mas (2015) report a remarkable similarity between 
the  cross-study average peer effect from laboratory experiments and field studies. 
Nonetheless, although existing studies provide compelling and clean evidence for 
the existence (or absence) of peer effects in specific settings, it is unclear to what 
extent their findings, which are all based on laboratory experiments or  real-world 
studies referring to a specific firm or occupation, apply to the labor market in general.
In this paper, therefore, we go beyond the existing literature to investigate peer 
effects in the workplace for a representative set of workers, firms, and sectors. Our 
unique dataset, which encompasses all workers and firms in one large local labor 
market over nearly two decades, allows us to compare the magnitude of peer effects 
across detailed sectors. It thus provides a rare opportunity to investigate whether the 
peer effects uncovered in the literature are confined to the specific firms or sectors 
studied or whether they carry over to the general labor market, thus shedding light 
on the external validity of the existing studies. At the same time, our comparison of 
the magnitude of peer effects across sectors provides new evidence on what drives 
these effects, whether social pressure or knowledge spillover.
In addition, unlike the extant studies, our analysis focuses on peer effects in 
wages rather than productivity thereby addressing for the first time whether or not 
1 Other papers focusing on social pressure include Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan (2010), who report pro-
ductivity spillovers among  data entry workers seated next to each other in an Indian company. Similarly, Bandiera, 
Barankay, and Rasul (2010) find that  soft-fruit pickers in one large UK farm are more productive if at least one of 
their more able friends is present on the same field but less productive if they are the most able among their friends. 
Peer pressure is also a likely channel in the Chan, Li, and Pierce (2014) finding of peer effects in productivity 
among salespersons of a department store, and in the general pattern of network effects in the productivity of  call 
center workers found by Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou (2015). In work that analyzes regional shirking differen-
tials in a large Italian bank, Ichino and Maggi (2000) find that average peer absenteeism has an effect on individual 
absenteeism. A controlled field experiment by Babcock et al. (2015) suggests that agent awareness of their own 
efforts’ effect on known peer payoffs creates incentives possibly mediated by a form of social pressure. 
2 In related work, Waldinger (2010) shows that faculty quality positively affects doctoral student outcomes, 
while Serafinelli (2013) provides evidence that worker mobility from high- to  low-wage firms increases the produc-
tivity of  low-wage firms, which is consistent with knowledge spillover. The findings by Lindquist, Sauermann, and 
Zenou (2015) and De Grip and Sauermann (2012) suggest knowledge transfer to be a relevant source of produc-
tivity spillover when trained and untrained workers interact. Other studies (e.g., Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo 
2009; Gould and Winter 2009) analyze such knowledge spillover between teammates in sports. For a  nontechnical 
discussion of evidence and implications of peer effects in coworker productivity, see also Cornelissen (2016). 
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workers are rewarded for a  peer-induced productivity increase through wages. To 
do so, we first develop a simple theoretical framework in which  peer-induced pro-
ductivity effects arise because of both social pressure and knowledge spillover and 
translate into  peer-related wage effects even when the firm extracts the entire surplus 
of the match. The rationale underlying this result is that, if a firm wants to ensure 
that workers remain with the company and exert  profit-maximizing effort, it must 
compensate them for the extra disutility from exercising additional effort because of 
knowledge spillover or peer pressure.
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we then estimate the effect of the  long-term 
or predetermined quality of a worker’s current peers—measured by the average 
wage fixed effect of coworkers in the same occupation and workplace (which we 
will refer to as “firms” for brevity)—on the current wage, a formulation that directly 
corresponds to our theoretical model. We implement this approach using an algo-
rithm developed by Arcidiacono et al. (2012), which allows simultaneous estimation 
of both individual and peer group fixed effects. Because we link a worker’s wage 
to predetermined characteristics (i.e., the peers’ average worker fixed effect) rather 
than to peer group wages or effort, we avoid Manski’s (1993) reflection problem.
To deal with worker sorting (i.e., the fact that high-quality workers may sort 
into high-quality peer groups or firms), we extend the worker and firm fixed effects 
model pioneered by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and estimated in 
for instance Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) and condition on an extensive set 
of fixed effects. First, by including worker fixed effects in our baseline specifica-
tion, we account for the potential sorting of high-ability workers into high-ability 
peer groups. In addition, to account for the potential sorting of high-ability work-
ers into firms, occupations, or  firm-occupation combinations that pay high wages, 
we include  firm-by-occupation fixed effects. To address the possibility that firms 
may attract better workers and raise wages at the same time, we further include 
 time-varying firm fixed effects (as well as  time-varying occupation fixed effects). As 
argued in Section IIA, this identification strategy is far tighter than most strategies 
used to estimate peer effects in other settings.
On average, we find only small, albeit precisely estimated, peer effects in wages: 
a one standard deviation increase in peer ability increases wages by 0.3 percentage 
points. Even if peer effects are small on average for a representative set of occupa-
tions, they might still be substantial for specific occupations. In fact, the specific 
occupations and tasks analyzed in the existent studies on peer pressure (i.e., super-
market cashiers, data entry workers, envelope stuffers, fruit pickers) are occupations 
in which there is more opportunity for coworkers to observe each other’s output, 
a prerequisite for peer pressure  buildup. Similarly, the specific occupations and 
tasks analyzed in the studies on knowledge spillover (i.e., scientists, teachers) are 
high-skilled and knowledge intensive, making learning from coworkers particularly 
important.
In a second analytical step, therefore, we restrict our analysis to occupations sim-
ilar to those studied in that literature. Nevertheless, in line with Waldinger (2012), 
in occupations for which we expect knowledge spillover to be important (i.e., occu-
pations that are particularly innovative and demand high skills), we again find only 
small peer effects in wages. On the other hand, in occupations where peer pressure 
tends to be more important (i.e., where the simple repetitive nature of the tasks 
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makes output more easily observable to coworkers), we find larger peer effects. 
In these occupations, a 10 percent increase in peer ability increases wages by 
0. 6–0.9 percent. Not only are these findings remarkably robust to a battery of robust-
ness checks, but we provide several types of additional evidence for social pressure 
being their primary source. In comparison, Mas and Moretti (2009) and Falk and 
Ichino (2006), studying peer effects in productivity (rather than in wages) in one 
large supermarket chain and in a controlled laboratory experiment, find effects that 
are about twice as large. This difference may be because of productivity increases 
not translating one-for-one into wage increases.
Our results are important for several reasons. First, our finding of only small 
peer effects in wages on average suggests that the larger peer effects established 
in specific settings in existing studies may not carry over to the labor market in 
general. Overall, therefore, our results suggest that peer effects do not contribute 
much to inequality in the economy.3 Second, even though our results suggest that 
the findings of earlier studies cannot be extended to the entire labor market, they 
do indicate that they can be generalized beyond the single firm or single occupa-
tion on which they are based. That is, our findings highlight larger peer effects in 
 low-skilled occupations in which coworkers can, because of the repetitive nature of 
the tasks performed, easily judge each other’s output—which are exactly the type 
of occupations most often analyzed in earlier studies on peer pressure. Our findings 
also add to the existing studies by showing that in such situations, peer effects lead 
not only to productivity spillover but also to wage spillover, as yet an unexplored 
topic in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines a 
theoretical framework that links peer effects in productivity engendered by social 
pressure and knowledge spillover to peer effects in wages. It also clarifies the inter-
pretation of the peer effect identified in the empirical analysis. Sections II and 
III then describe our identification strategy and our data, respectively. Section IV 
reports our results, and Section V summarizes our findings.
I. Theoretical Framework
To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a simple  principal-agent model 
of unobserved worker effort in which peer effects in productivity translate into peer 
effects in wages, and model two channels: knowledge spillover and social pres-
sure. Here, we focus on the basics of the model, and delegate details to online 
Appendix A.
A. Basic Model
Production Function and Knowledge Spillover.—Consider a firm that employs 
N workers. In the theoretical analysis, we abstract from the endogenous sorting 
of workers into firms, which our empirical analysis takes into account. We next 
3 Our general result of no strong peer effects within firms is in line with a recent paper by Bloom et al. (2015), 
who show that workers who work from home are somewhat more productive than those who come in to work. 
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 suppose that worker i produces individual output  f i according to the following pro-
duction function:
  f i =  y i +  ε i =  a i +  e i (1 +  λ K   _ a~i ) +  ε i ,
where  y i is the systematic component of worker i’s productive capacity, depend-
ing on individual ability  a i , individual effort  e i , and average peer ability (excluding 
worker i )  _ a~i . In this production function, individual effort and peer ability are com-
plements, meaning that workers benefit from better peers only if they themselves 
expend effort. In other words, the return to effort is increasing in peer ability, and 
the greater this increase, the more important the knowledge spillover captured by 
the parameter  λ K .4 The component  ε i is a random variable reflecting output vari-
ation that is beyond the workers’ control and has an expected mean of zero. Firm 
productivity simply equals the sum of worker outputs. Whereas a worker’s ability is 
exogenously given and observed by all parties, effort is an endogenous choice vari-
able. As is standard in the principal agent literature, we assume that the firm cannot 
separately observe either worker effort  e i or random productivity shocks  ε i .
Cost of Effort and Social Pressure.—Because exerting effort is costly to the 
worker, we assume that in the absence of peer pressure, the cost of effort function is 
quadratic in effort:  C ( e i ) = k e i 2 . As in Barron and Gjerde (1997), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and Mas and Moretti (2009), we introduce peer pressure by augmenting the 
individual cost of effort function  C( · ) with a social “peer pressure” function P( · ) 
that depends on individual effort  e i and average peer output  
_
 f~i (excluding worker  i ). 
We propose a particularly simple functional form for the peer pressure function: 
 P ( e i ,  _ f~i ) =  λ P (m −  e i )  _ f~i , where  λ P and  m  can be thought of as both the “strength” 
and the “pain” from peer pressure. The total disutility associated with effort thus 
becomes
  c i = C ( e i ) + P ( e i ,   _ f~i ) = k  e i 2 +  λ P (m −  e i )  _ f~i . 
Although the exact expressions derived in this section depend on the specific func-
tional form for the total disutility associated with effort, our general argument does 
not. This peer pressure function implies that the marginal cost of worker effort is 
declining in peer output  (i.e.,   ∂ 
2 P ( e i ,   _ f~i )  _______∂ e i ∂  _ f~i     = − λ 
P < 0) . This condition implies 
that it is less costly to exert an additional unit of effort when the quality of one’s 
4 It should be noted that, just as in extant studies, this formulation abstracts from the dynamic implications of 
knowledge spillover, and is best interpreted as one of contemporaneous knowledge spillover through assistance and 
cooperation between workers on the job. The underlying rationale is that workers with better peers are more pro-
ductive on the job because they receive more helpful advice from their coworkers than if they were in a  low-quality 
peer group. Moreover, although a high-quality coworker may still boost a worker’s productivity even when the 
two are no longer working together, one would still expect current peers to be more important than past peers. In 
addition, this specification assumes that own effort and time is required to “unlock” the potential of one’s peers’ 
ability. This assumption of complementarity between knowledge spillover and effort provision is one of the drivers 
of why knowledge spillover translates into wages in our model: workers exposed to better peers exert higher effort, 
for which they have to be compensated in terms of higher wages. 
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peers is high than when it is low. We further assume that, like Barron and Gjerde 
(1997), workers dislike working in a  high-pressure environment—which amounts to 
imposing a lower bound on the parameter (capturing the “pain from peers”) in the 
peer pressure function P( · ) (see online Appendix A.1 for details).
Wage Contracts and Worker Preferences.—Firms choose a wage contract that 
provides their workers with the proper incentives to exert effort. Because the firm 
cannot disentangle  e i and εi, however, it cannot contract a worker’s effort directly 
but must instead contract output  f i . As is typical in the related literature, we restrict 
the analysis to linear wage contracts. Contrary to the standard principal agent 
model, we assume that not only firms but also workers are risk neutral, an assump-
tion that simplifies our analysis without being a necessary condition for our general 
argument.
B. The Worker’s Maximization Problem
Because of risk neutrality, workers maximize their expected wage minus the 
combined cost of effort. As shown in online Appendix A.2, this leads to the first 
order condition
(1)  e i =   λ P  ___2k  
_
 e~i +  b ___ 2k +   λ 
P + b  λ K _______ 
2k
   _ a~i   for  i = 1, … ,  N, 
where  b denotes the slope of the wage contract with respect to worker output. This 
first order condition not only highlights that equilibrium effort is increasing in peer 
ability (see last term), either because of peer pressure  λ P or knowledge spillover    λ K , 
but also that peer pressure ( λ P > 0) leads to a social multiplier effect whereby the 
more effort exerted by peers, the more effort exerted by the worker ( e i is increasing 
in    _ e~i ).
C. The Firm’s Optimization Problem
Firms choose the intercept and slope (or incentive) parameter of the wage con-
tract by maximizing expected profits,  EP =  ∑ i  E [   f i −  w i ] , taking into account the 
workers’ optimal effort levels  e i ⁎ , subject to the participation constraint that work-
ers receive a utility that is at least as high as the outside option  v( a i ) :  E  U i ≥ v( a i ) . 
Assuming that the participation constraint holds with equality so that the firm pushes 
the worker’s wage to her reservation utility, the firm ultimately rewards the worker 
for the outside option  v ( a i ) , the cost of effort  C ( e i ⁎ ) , and the disutility from peer 
pressure  P ( e i ⁎ ,  _ y~i ) :
(2)  E  w i = v ( a i ) + C ( e i ⁎ ) + P ( e i ⁎ ,  _ y~i ) . 
We can then derive the firm’s first order condition and an expression for the slope  b ∗ 
of the optimal wage contract as detailed in online Appendix A.3.
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D. The Effect of Peer Quality on Wages
We obtain the average effect of peer ability on wages—our parameter of interest 
in the empirical analysis—by differentiating equation (2) and taking averages:
(3)  1 __ N   ∑ i   
dE  w i  ____
d  _ a~i =  
1 __ N   ∑ i   b ⁎   
∂  f i ___∂ e i  
d e i ⁎  ____
d  _ a~i  
 Wage response to  
own effort increase
 
 +  1 __ 
N  ∑ i  
∂ P ( e i ,  _ y~i )  ________∂  _ y~i    
d  _ y~i  ____
d  _ a~i   
 Wage response to disutility   
from social pressure
 
 ,
where all terms are evaluated at optimal effort levels and at the optimal  b . The first 
term captures the wage response to the increase in workers’ own effort and consists 
of three parts which are all positive: the slope of the wage contract,  b ⁎ , the marginal 
effect of effort on productivity,  
∂ f i __∂ e i  , and the effect of peer ability on equilibrium 
effort,  
d  e i ⁎  ___
d  _ a~i  (see equation (1)). The second term is likewise positive and captures that 
higher peer ability is associated with higher peer output  ( d  
_
 y~i  ___
d  _ a~i > 0) , which causes 
additional “pain” from peer pressure   ( ∂ P ( e i ,  
_
 y~i )  ______∂  _ y~i  > 0) for which the worker has to 
be compensated. Our model thus predicts that the average effect of peer ability on 
wages will be unambiguously positive—because better peers induce the worker to 
exert more effort and to work under pressure, for which the firm has to compensate 
the worker.
II. Empirical Implementation
In our empirical analysis, we seek to estimate the average effect of peer ability on 
wages as derived in equation (3). While in the model above we abstract from worker 
sorting, our empirical analysis needs to take account of  nonrandom allocation of 
workers to firms and unobserved background characteristics. As we describe in detail 
below, to deal with worker sorting, our baseline empirical strategy extends the worker 
and firm fixed effects model pioneered by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) 
and conditions on an extensive set of fixed effects. We define a worker’s peer group 
as all workers working in the same ( three-digit) occupation and in the same firm 
in period  t (see Section IIIB for a detailed discussion of the peer group definition).
A. Baseline Specification and Identification
First, we estimate the following baseline wage equation:
(4)  ln  w iojt =  a i + γ  _ a~i,ojt +  x iojt ′  β +  ω ot +  δ jt +  θ oj +  v iojt .
Here  ln  w iojt is the individual log real wage,  x iojt is a vector of  time-varying char-
acteristics with an associated coefficient vector β, i indexes workers, o indexes 
occupations, j indexes workplaces or production sites (which we label “firms” for 
simplicity), t indexes time periods, and  a i  is a worker fixed effect. The term  _ a~i,ojt   
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corresponds to  
_
 a~i in the theoretical model, and is the average worker fixed effect in 
the peer group, computed by excluding individual i. The coefficient  γ is the param-
eter of interest and measures (a positive monotone transformation of) the spillover 
effect in wages  ( 1 __N   ∑ i    dE  w i  ___d  _ a~i in equation (3)) which embodies not only the direct 
effect of peer ability on wages, holding peer effort constant, but also the social mul-
tiplier effect arising from workers’ effort reactions in response to increases in the 
current effort of their peers.5 Identifying this  reduced-form or total effect of peers’ 
 long-term productivity on wages requires conditioning on  
_
 a~i,ojt as a measure of the 
peers’  long-term productivity (a predetermined characteristic), but not conditioning 
on contemporaneous peer effort or productivity (or as a proxy thereof, peers’ current 
wages).6
Nonetheless, identifying the causal peer effect  γ is challenging because of con-
founding factors such as shared background characteristics. Here, we first discuss 
the conditions required for a causal interpretation of the peer effect  γ assuming 
that  a i and  _ a~i,ojt in equation (4) are observed. Then, in Section IIC, we outline the 
issues arising from the fact that  a i and  _ a~i,ojt are unobserved and must be estimated. 
While we are confident that our estimation strategy results in unbiased estimates of 
the effect of peer quality on wages, we will argue that any possible remaining bias is 
likely to be upward, so that our estimates are upper bounds of peer effects.
Peer quality may affect a worker’s wage simply because high-quality work-
ers sort into high-quality peer groups or high-quality firms, leading to a spurious 
correlation between peer quality and wages. Our estimation strategy accounts for 
the endogenous sorting of workers into peer groups or firms by including control 
variables and multiple fixed effects. First, because our baseline specification in 
equation (4) includes worker fixed effects, it accounts for the potential sorting of 
high-ability workers into high-ability peer groups.7 Second,  time-varying occupa-
tion effects  ω ot are included to capture diverging time trends in occupational pay 
differentials. Moreover, our inclusion of  time-varying firm fixed effects  δ jt controls 
for shocks that are firm specific. Finally, by controlling for firm specific occupation 
effects  θ oj , we allow for the possibility that a firm may pay specific occupations rel-
atively well (or badly) compared to the market.
Estimation of  γ in equation (4) exploits two sources of variation: changes in peer 
quality for workers who switch peer groups (after having controlled for the accom-
panying changes in firm and occupation specific fixed effects), and changes in peer 
quality for workers who remain with their peer group, induced by other workers 
joining or leaving the peer group. Focusing on the latter source of variation, our 
identification strategy can essentially be understood as a  difference-in-differences 
estimator. To see this, denote by  a ̃iojt the peer group quality purged from effects 
of observables  ( x iojt ) and  occupation-specific shocks common to all firms in the 
5 It should be noted that the theoretical wage equation in (3) refers to wage levels, whereas the empirical wage 
equation in (4) is estimated in logs. Since the logarithm is a positive monotone transformation, the key prediction of 
our model carries over to log wages: In the presence of knowledge spillover or peer pressure, both wage levels and 
log wages are increasing in peer ability (i.e.,  γ > 0 ). 
6 Therefore, there is no reflection problem in estimating the peer effect  γ in equation (4) (Manski 1993). 
7 Since  x iojt in equation (4) includes quadratics in age and firm tenure, the worker fixed effects are net of age and 
job tenure, and the average peer fixed effect does not capture effects of peer age or peer job tenure. 
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economy ( ω ot ) .8 Suppose further for simplicity that all firms consist of two occu-
pations only, denoted by o and o′. First differencing of equation (4) for peer group 
stayers eliminates the  time-constant worker and  firm-occupation fixed effects  a i and 
 θ oj —and more generally any  time-constant effects such as a  match-specific 
effects  m ioj —but does not remove the  firm-specific shock common to all occupa-
tions in the firm ( Δ  δ jt ) : Δln  w iojt =  γΔ  a ̃iojt + Δ  δ jt  + Δ  v iojt . This effect can be 
eliminated through differencing a second time, between occupations o and o′ in the 
same firm that experienced different changes in peer quality:
(5)   Δ  ‾ ln w ojt s 
⏟first difference
 − Δ   ‾ ln w o′ jt s 

second difference
 = γ  (Δ  a ̃–ojt s − Δ  a ̃–o′jt s ) +  (Δ  _ vojt s − Δ  _ vo′jt s ) . 
This  firm-level regression consistently estimates  γ provided that 
 cov (Δ  a ̃–ojt s − Δ  a ̃–o′jt s , Δ  v –ojt s − Δ  v –o′jt s ) = 0. This condition says that peer group 
stayers in both occupations in the firm experience the same time shock, which corre-
sponds to the standard common time trend assumption in  difference-in-differences 
estimation.
Our identification assumptions are considerably weaker than the assumptions typ-
ically invoked in the education literature, which seek to identify exogenous spillover 
effects (e.g., the impact of the share of girls, Blacks, immigrants, or grade repeaters 
on individual performance). The most common approach in these studies—measur-
ing  grade-level peer characteristics and exploiting  within-school variation over time 
(e.g., Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 2009; Hanushek et al. 2003; Hoxby 2000; Lavy 
and Schlosser 2011; Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser 2012)—does not allow for the 
possibility that the average quality of students (in our case, workers) in the school 
(firm) changes over time, or that the school’s effect on student performance (wages) 
may vary over time. Other research employs an alternative approach: measuring 
peer characteristics at the classroom level and exploiting  within-school  grade-year 
variation (e.g., Ammermueller and Pischke 2009; Betts and Zau 2004; McEwan 
2003; Vigdor and Nechyba 2007). This technique, however, requires random assign-
ment of students into classrooms within the school (equivalent to occupations within 
a firm), thereby ruling out  within-school student tracking. Our analysis, in contrast, 
can account for nonrandom selection into occupations within firms by including 
 firm-specific occupation effects.
B. Within–Peer Group Estimator
One remaining concern may be the possible presence of  time-varying peer 
 group-specific wage shocks that are correlated with shocks to peer group quality, 
violating the common time trend assumption highlighted above. The existence of 
such shocks is likely to lead to a bias. For example, a firm may adopt a new tech-
nology specific to one occupation only, simultaneously raising wages and worker 
8 That is,  a ̃iojt is the residual from the regression of  _ a~i,ojt on  x iojt   and  ω ot . 
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quality in that occupation relative to other occupations in the firm, implying that 
 cov (Δ  a ̃–ojt s − Δ  a ̃–o′jt s , Δ  v –ojt s − Δ  v –o′jt s ) > 0. 
One way to deal with this problem is to condition on the full set of  time-varying 
peer group fixed effects  p ojt . Note that the parameter  γ remains identified because 
focal worker i is excluded from the average peer group quality. As a result, the 
average peer group quality of the same group of workers differs for each worker, 
and  a –~i,ojt differs for each worker within a peer group at any given point in time. 
Using only  within–peer group variation for identification yields the following esti-
mation equation:9
(6)  ln  w iojt =  a i + γ   a –~i,ojt +  x iojt T β +  p ojt +  ε iojt .
This  within–peer group estimator, however, although it effectively deals with unob-
served  time-varying peer group characteristics, employs only limited and specific 
variation in  
_
 a~i,ojt . That is, as shown in online Appendix B, the spillover effect in 
equation (6) is identified only if peer groups vary in size. The advantage of being 
able to control for  time-varying shocks to the peer group is thus countered by the 
disadvantage that only one particular type of variation is used to identify the effect. 
The  within–peer group estimator in equation (6), therefore, serves as a robustness 
check only, rather than as our main specification.
C. Estimation
Whereas our discussion so far assumes that the individual and average worker 
fixed effects  a i and  _ a~i,ojt are observed, they are in fact unobserved and must be 
estimated. The multiplication of  
_
 a~i,ojt and  γ , both parameters to be estimated, 
turns equations (4) and (6) into nonlinear least squares problems. Because the 
fixed effects are high dimensional (i.e., we have approximately 600,000 firm years, 
200,000  occupation-firm combinations, and 2,100,000 workers), using standard 
nonlinear least squares routines to solve the problem is infeasible. Rather, we adopt 
the alternative estimation procedure suggested by Arcidiacono et al. (2012), which 
is detailed in online Appendix C. An appealing characteristic of this estimation pro-
cedure is that the nonlinear least squares estimator for γ is consistent as the sample 
size grows in panels with a limited number of time periods , even though the indi-
vidual worker fixed effects  a i are generally inconsistent in this situation. This result, 
however, requires further assumptions in addition to those we discussed above 
for the case when  a i and  _ a~i,ojt are observed (see Theorem 1 in Arcidiacono et al. 
2012). Most importantly, the error terms between any two observations ( v iojt in our 
equation (4) baseline specification and  ε iojt in our equation (6)  within–peer group 
estimator) must be uncorrelated. This assumption not only rules out serially cor-
related wage shocks, but also, in our baseline regression, any wage shocks common 
to the peer group, even those uncorrelated with peer group quality. This additional 
assumption is necessary for consistent estimation when  a i and  _ a~i,ojt are unobserved 
because peer  group-specific wage shocks affect not only peer group member wages 
9 Because the fixed effects  δ jt ,  ω ot , and  θ oj do not vary within peer groups at any given point in time, they are 
absorbed by  p ojt . 
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but also estimated fixed effects in panels with a short T. Any such impact could lead 
to a spurious correlation between individual wages and the estimated worker fixed 
effects in the peer group even when the peer  group-specific wage shocks are uncor-
related with the true worker fixed effects in the peer group.
Results from a Monte Carlo study discussed in online Appendix F.1 show that 
while serial correlation of a plausible magnitude hardly biases peer effect estimates 
in our application,  time-varying random peer group level shocks are likely to lead 
to an upward bias in panels with short T. However, under realistic assumptions the 
bias is not large enough to spuriously generate the level of peer effects that we find 
in low-skilled repetitive occupations. Moreover, results from the Monte Carlo study 
confirm that even if  time-varying peer group shocks were present, the  within–peer 
group estimator of equation (6) deals directly with the bias problem—as it condi-
tions on  peer-group level wage shocks.
III. Data
Our dataset comes from over three decades of German social security records that 
cover every man and woman in the system observed on June 30 of each year. This 
dataset is particularly suited for the analytical purpose because it includes identifiers 
for single production sites or workplaces (referred to as “firms” for simplicity), as 
well as detailed occupational codes that distinguish 331 occupations. Such detail 
allows us to define peer groups of coworkers in the same firm who are likely to inter-
act. We can also observe all workers in each firm, which allows precise calculation 
of the average peer group characteristics and ensures that our findings are represen-
tative of both the firms and the workers.
A. Sample Selection
Focusing on the years 1989–2005, we select all workers aged between 16 and 65 
in one large metropolitan labor market, the city of Munich and its surrounding dis-
tricts.10 Because most workers who change jobs remain in their local labor market, 
concentrating on one large metropolitan labor market rather than a random sample 
of workers ensures that our sample captures most worker mobility between firms, 
which is important for our identification strategy of estimating firm and worker fixed 
effects. Since only the fixed effects within a group of firms connected by worker 
mobility are identified relative to each other, we restrict our sample to the biggest 
connected mobility group (which makes up 99.5 percent of the initial sample; see 
Section IIIE for more details).11
Because the wages of  part-time workers and apprentices cannot be meaningfully 
compared to those of regular  full-time workers, we base our estimations on  full-time 
10 We focus on the large metropolitan labor market rather than Germany as a whole in order to reduce the 
computational burden, which is far higher than in conventional linear worker and firm fixed effects models (as in, 
e.g., Card, Heining, and Kline 2013), due to the inclusion of average peer quality in addition to  firm-by-time and 
 firm-by  occupation-effects. Robustness checks we provide below and comparisons between the Munich area and 
Germany as a whole discussed in online Appendix F.2 suggest that results for the whole of Germany would not be 
very different. 
11 Two firms are directly connected if worker mobility is observed between them in any sample period. A 
“connected mobility group” is the group of firms that are either directly or indirectly (via other firms) connected. 
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workers not in apprenticeship. Additionally, to ensure that every worker is matched 
with at least one peer, we drop peer groups ( firm-occupation-year combinations) 
with only one worker.
B. Definition of the Peer Group
We define the worker’s peer group as all workers employed in the same firm and 
the same  three-digit occupation, the smallest occupation level available in the social 
security data. These include detailed occupational definitions such as bricklayers, 
florists, plumbers, pharmacists, and high school teachers. Defining the peer group 
at the  three-digit (as opposed to the one- or  two-digit) occupation level not only 
ensures that workers in the same peer group are likely to interact with each other, a 
prerequisite for knowledge spillover, but also that workers in the same peer group 
perform similar tasks and are thus likely to judge each other’s output, a prerequisite 
for peer pressure  buildup. Occupations at the  two-digit level, in contrast, often lump 
together rather different occupations. For example, the  three-digit occupation of a 
cashier is part of the same  two-digit occupation as accountants and computer and 
data processing consultants. In online Appendix D, we show that defining the peer 
group as too large or too small is likely to lead to attenuation bias of the true peer 
effect. However, the robustness and placebo tests in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that our 
peer group definition at the  three-digit occupation level is the most plausible.
C. Isolating Occupations with High Levels of Peer Pressure 
and Knowledge Spillover
One important precondition for the  buildup of peer pressure is that workers can 
mutually observe and judge each other’s output, an evaluation facilitated when tasks 
are relatively simple and standardized but more difficult when job duties are diverse 
and complex. To identify occupations characterized by more standardized tasks, for 
which we expect peer pressure to be important, we rely on a further data source, 
the 1991/1992 wave of the Qualification and Career Survey (see Gathmann and 
Schönberg 2010, for a detailed description). In addition to detailed questions on task 
usage, respondents are asked how frequently they perform repetitive tasks and tasks 
that are predefined in detail. From the answers, we generate a combined score on 
which to rank occupations. We then choose the set of occupations with the highest 
incidence of repetitive and predefined tasks, which encompasses 5 percent of the 
workers in our sample (see column 1 of online Appendix Table F.3 for a full list of 
the occupations in this group). This group of most repetitive occupations includes 
agricultural workers, the subject of the Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010) study, 
and cashiers, the focus of the Mas and Moretti (2009) study. The remaining occupa-
tions are mostly low-skilled manual occupations, such as unskilled laborers, pack-
agers, or metal workers.
For robustness, we also estimate peer effects for the exact same occupations 
as in the extant studies using  real-world data—that is, cashiers (Mas and Moretti 
2009), agricultural helpers (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2010), and data entry 
workers (Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan 2010)—as well as for a handpicked set 
of low-skilled occupations in which, after initial induction,  on-the-job learning is 
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limited. This subgroup, which includes waiters, cashiers, agricultural helpers, vehi-
cle cleaners, and packagers among  others, makes up 14 percent of the total sample 
(see column 2 of online Appendix Table F.3 for a full list). Unlike the 5 percent 
most repetitive occupations, this group excludes specialized skill craft occupations 
in which learning may be important, such as ceramic workers or pattern makers.
To isolate occupations in which we expect high knowledge spillover, we select 
the 10 percent most skilled occupations in terms of workers’ educational attain-
ment (average share of university graduates), which includes not only the scien-
tists, academics, and teachers used in previous studies, but also professionals such 
as architects and physicians. As a robustness check, we also construct a combined 
index based on two additional items in the Qualification and Career Survey: whether 
individuals need to learn new tasks and think anew, and whether they need to exper-
iment and try out new ideas. From this index, we derive the 10 percent of occupa-
tions with the highest scores, which again includes scientists and academics but 
also musicians and IT specialists. We further handpick a group of occupations that 
appear very knowledge intensive, including doctors, lawyers, scientists, teachers, 
and academics (see columns 3 to 5 of online Appendix Table F.3 for a full list of 
occupations in these three groups).
It should be noted that when focusing on occupational subgroups, we still estimate 
the model on the full sample and allow the peer effect to differ for both the respective 
subgroups and the remaining occupations. Doing so ensures that we use all informa-
tion available for firms and workers, which makes the estimated  firm-year and worker 
fixed effects—and hence the measure for average peer quality—more reliable.
D. Wage Censoring
As is common in social security data, wages in our database are right censored 
at the social security contribution ceiling. Such censoring, although it affects only 
0.7 percent of the wage observations in the 5 percent most repetitive occupations, is 
high in occupations with high expected knowledge spillover. We therefore impute 
 top-coded wages using a procedure similar to that employed by Dustmann, Ludsteck, 
and Schönberg (2009) and Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) (see online Appendix E 
for details). Whether or not we impute wages, however, our results remain similar 
even in the high-skilled occupations with high censoring. This finding is not surpris-
ing given that censoring generally causes the distributions of both worker fixed effects 
and average peer quality to be compressed in the same way as the dependent variable, 
meaning that censoring need not lead to a large bias in the estimated peer effect.
E. Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1, we compare the 5 percent most repetitive occupations, in which we 
expect particularly high peer pressure, and the 10 percent most skilled occupations, 
in which we expect high knowledge spillover, against all occupations in our sample. 
Clearly, the 5 percent most repetitive occupations are low-skilled occupations: nearly 
half (47 percent) the workers have no  post-secondary education (compared to 17 per-
cent in the full sample and 4 percent in the skilled occupations sample) and virtually 
no worker has graduated from a college or university (compared to 18 percent in the 
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full sample and 80 percent in the skilled occupations sample). As expected, the learn-
ing content in the 5 percent most repetitive occupations is low, while it is high in the 
10 percent most skilled occupations, as implied by responses to whether individuals 
need to learn new tasks or to experiment with new ideas. The median peer group size 
of three or four workers per peer group is similar in all three samples. Not surpris-
ingly, peer group size is heavily skewed, with the mean peer group size exceeding 
 the median peer group size by a factor of about  3–4 in the three samples.
To identify peer effects in wages, individual wages must be flexible enough to 
react to peer quality induced changes in productivity. The evidence presented in 
Figure 1 and the bottom half of Table 1 illustrates that despite relatively high col-
lective bargaining coverage rates in Germany, there is substantial wage variation 
across coworkers in the same occupation and firm.12 First, the  within–peer group 
standard deviation of the log wage residuals (obtained from a regression of log 
wages on  quadratics in age and firm tenure and aggregate time trends) accounts for 
a considerable share of the overall standard deviation: about half in the full sample 
12 Collective bargaining agreements in Germany allow for substantial real wage flexibility. First, nothing pre-
vents firms from paying wages above the level stipulated by collective agreements, or to pay extra bonuses based 
on performance. About 90 percent of workers receive some form of wage supplement on top of their wage base 
(own calculations based on the German  Socio-Economic Panel  1994–2006). Second, wages are usually tied to job 
titles, not to occupations. Hence within occupations in the same firm, there can be different ranks of job titles into 
which workers can be promoted based on their productivity. Third, collectively bargained wage floors are agreed in 
nominal terms, which allows for  real wage cuts by freezing nominal wages. 
Table 1—Skill Content, Peer Group Size, and Wage Flexibility for Different Occupational Groups
All 
occupations
5 percent
most repetitive
occupations
10 percent 
most skilled
occupations
Skill content
Share without postsecondary education 0.17 0.47 0.04
Share with university degree 0.18 0.01 0.80
To what extent does the following occur in your daily work?
 (0 = never, … , 4 = all the time)
  Need to learn new tasks and think anew 2.25 1.36 2.98
  Need to experiment and try out new ideas 1.80 0.96 2.56
Peer group size
Median 3  4  3
Mean 9.3 12.3 13.1
Wage flexibility
Standard deviation of log real wage (imputed) 0.472 0.326 0.371
Standard deviation of log real wage residuala 0.377 0.308 0.365
 Within–peer group standard deviation of log real wage residuala 0.243 0.200 0.269
Probability of >5 percent real wage cut (peer group stayers) 0.088 0.130 0.034
Average wage growth 0.022 0.016 0.023
Notes: The table compares all occupations (N = 12,832,842  worker-year observations) with the 5 percent most 
repetitive occupations (N = 681,391) and the 10 percent most skilled occupations (N = 1,309,070). See online 
Appendix Table F.3 for a full list of occupations, and Section IIIC of the text for the definition of repetitive and 
skilled occupations.
a Residual from a  log-wage regression, after controlling for aggregate time effects, education, and quadratics in 
firm tenure and age.
Sources: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005, combined with information from 
Qualification and Career Survey 1991/1992.
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(0.24 versus 0.47), about two-thirds in the 5 percent most repetitive occupations 
sample (0.20 versus 0.33), and about three quarters in the 10 percent most skilled 
occupations sample (0.27 versus 0.37). Second, real wages are downwardly flexi-
ble: about 9 percent of  peer-group stayers in the full sample, 3 percent in the skilled 
occupations sample, and 13 percent in the repetitive occupations sample experience 
a real wage cut from one year to another of at least 5 percent. Third, as the figures in 
the last row of Table 1 illustrate, average real wage growth over our sample period 
was positive and in the order of 2 percent per year, implying that decreases in pro-
ductivity can be accommodated by raising wages more slowly rather than actually 
cutting nominal or real wages.
We provide additional information on the structure of our sample in Table 2. Our 
overall sample consists of 2,115,544 workers, 89,581 firms, and 1,387,216 peer 
groups; workers are observed on average for 6.1 time periods and there are 2.3 peer 
groups on average per firm and year. Separately identifying worker,  firm-occupation 
and  firm-time fixed effects requires worker mobility between occupations and firms. 
In our sample, workers have on average worked for 1.6 firms and in 1.4 differ-
ent occupations. This amount of mobility is sufficient to identify  firm-year and 
 firm-occupation fixed effects for nearly the entire sample: the biggest connected 
groups for  firm-time effects and  firm-occupation fixed effects contain 99.4 percent 
and 98.3 percent of the original observations, respectively, compared to 99.5 per-
cent for the more standard firm fixed effects.13
13 Note that all firm stayers are “movers” between  firm-time units so that it is not surprising that the connected 
group is nearly as large for  firm-by-time fixed effects as for the firm fixed effects. Further note that unlike standard 
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Figure 1. Variability of Wages Across and Within Peer Groups
Notes: The figure compares all occupations (N = 12,832,842), the 5 percent most repetitive 
occupations (N = 681,391), and the 10 percent most skilled occupations (N = 1,309,070) in 
terms of the variability of wages. Residualized wages are computed from a log-wage regression 
controlling for aggregate time effects, education, and quadratics in firm tenure and age.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market, 1989–2005
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In our baseline specification based on equation (4), the standard deviation of 
the estimated worker fixed effects for the full sample ( a i in equation (4)) is 0.32 or 
70 percent of the overall standard deviation of log wages. The average worker fixed 
effects in the peer group (excluding the focal worker  _ a~i,ojt in equation (4)) has a 
standard deviation of 0.24, which is about 50 percent of the overall standard devia-
tion of the log wage.
As explained in Section IIA, our baseline specification identifies the causal effect 
of peers on wages by exploiting two main sources of variation in peer quality: 
changes to the peer group  make-up as workers join and leave the group, and moves 
to new peer groups by the focal worker. In Figure 2, we plot the kernel density esti-
mates of the change in a worker’s average peer quality from one year to the next 
separately for those who remain in the peer group (stayers) and those who leave 
(movers). Not surprisingly, the standard deviation of the change in average peer 
quality is more than three times as high for peer group movers than for peer group 
stayers (0.20 versus 0.06; see also Table 2). Yet even for workers who remain in their 
peer group, there is considerable variation in average peer quality from one year to 
the next, corresponding to roughly 20 percent of the overall variation in average 
peer quality. As expected, for peer group stayers, the kernel density has a mass 
point at zero, corresponding to stayers in peer groups that no worker joins or leaves. 
Nonetheless, peer groups without turnover are rare. In our sample, 90 percent of 
observations are in peer groups with at least some worker turnover. At 20 percent, 
 firm-fixed effects, the  firm-occupation fixed effects are identified not only through worker mobility across firms, but 
also through worker mobility between occupations within firms. 
Table 2—Structure of Sample
Panel structure
(i) Number of workers 2,115,544 
(ii) Number of firms 89,581 
(iii) Number of peer groups (occupations within  firm years) 1,387,216
(iv) Average number of time periods per worker 6.07
(v) Number of peer groups per  firm year 2.30
(vi) Average number of employers per worker 1.60
(vii) Average number of occupations per worker 1.40
(viii) Share of mobility group with identified firm fixed effects 0.995
(ix) Share of mobility group with identified  firm-time fixed effects 0.994
(x) Share of mobility group with identified  firm-occupation fixed effects 0.983
Variation in wages, peer quality, and worker turnover
(xi) Standard deviation worker fixed effect 0.32
(xii) Standard deviation average peer fixed effect 0.24
(xiii) Standard deviation change of average peer fixed effect from  t − 1 to t 0.09
(xiv) Standard deviation change of average peer fixed effect from  t − 1 to t − Movers 0.20
(xv) Standard deviation change of average peer fixed effect from  t − 1 to t − Stayers 0.06
(xvi) Share of  worker-year observations in peer groups with turnover 0.90
(xvii) Average share of workers replaced by turnover 0.20
(xviii) Correlation worker fixed effect/average peer fixed effect 0.64
(xix) Correlation worker fixed effect/ firm-time effect 0.14
(xx) Correlation worker fixed effect/ firm-occupation effect   0.16
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics describing the panel structure of the dataset, as well as the variation in 
wages, peer quality and worker turnover which we exploit in subsequent estimations. N = 12,832,842.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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the average peer group turnover in our sample, computed as 0.5 times the number of 
workers who join or leave divided by peer group size, is quite large and implies that 
nearly 20 percent of workers in the peer group are replaced every year.
At the bottom of the table, we report correlation coefficients between the various 
fixed effects in equation (4). In our sample, the individual worker fixed effect and 
the average fixed effect of the peer group are with a correlation coefficient of 0.64 
strongly positively correlated. In line with Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), we also 
find a positive correlation between the worker and the  firm-time and  firm-occupation 
fixed effects of 0.14 and 0.16, respectively. These correlations illustrate the endog-
enous sorting of  high-ability workers into high-ability and high-wage peer groups 
and underscore the need to account for sorting in our estimates.
IV. Results
A. Baseline Results
We report estimates for the impact of average peer quality, measured as the average 
worker fixed effect of coworkers in the peer group, on wages for the full sample in 
Table 3. Each column of the table introduces additional control variables to account 
for shared background characteristics. In column 1, we control for the worker’s own 
fixed effect ( a i in equation (4)), for quadratics in age and firm tenure (captured by  x iojt   
in equation (4)), and for  time-varying occupation fixed effects ( ω ot   in equation (4)), 
in addition to firm fixed effects. The coefficient of 0.148 implies that a 10 percent 
increase in peer quality increases wages by 1.48 percent—an estimate roughly 
0
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Figure 2. Variation of the Change in Peer Quality
Notes: The figure plots a kernel density estimate of the change in the average peer fixed effect (FE) separately for 
peer group stayers and peer group movers. Peer group quality varies more strongly for movers. For stayers, there 
is a mass point at zero, corresponding to stayers in peer groups that had no turnover. The figure is trimmed at the 
fifth percentile and ninety-fifth percentile of the distribution.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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 similar in magnitude to those reported by Lengermann (2002) and Battisti (2013) in 
a related specification. While this specification accounts for the possibility that work-
ers employed in  high-wage firms work with better peers, it does not allow for firms 
which overpay specific occupations relative to the market to attract better workers into 
these occupations. To deal with this type of worker sorting, we control in column 2 
for  firm-occupation fixed effects ( θ oj in equation (4)) instead of simple firm fixed 
effects. This specification produces a much smaller estimate: a 10 percent increase 
in peer quality now increases the individual wage by only 0.66 percent. It does not 
yet filter out  time-varying shocks at firm level common to all occupations in the firm. 
Such shocks turn out to be important: When adding  time-varying firm fixed effects ( δ jt 
in equation (4)) in column 3, we find that a 10 percent increase in peer quality raises 
individual wages by merely 0.1 percent. Translated into standard deviations, this out-
come implies that a one standard deviation increase in peer ability increases wages by 
0.3 percentage points or 0.6 percent of a standard deviation. This effect is about 10–15 
times smaller than the effects previously identified for productivity among supermar-
ket cashiers in a single firm (Mas and Moretti 2009) and students carrying out a simple 
task in an experiment (Falk and Ichino 2006)—which incidentally are very close to 
the average effect reported by Herbst and Mas (2015) from a larger range of studies 
mostly covering specific field or lab settings. Therefore, we do not confirm similarly 
large spillover effects in wages for a representative set of occupations and firms.
B. Effects for Occupational Subgroups
Repetitive Occupations.—Even if peer effects in wages are small on average 
for a representative set of occupations, they might still be substantial for specific 
occupations. Hence, in panel A of Table 4, we report the results for the 5 percent 
Table 3—Peer Effects in the Full Sample
Observables, 
 occupation-year, and 
firm fixed effects
(1)
Plus  
firm-occupation 
fixed effects
(2)
Plus  firm-occupation 
and  firm-year fixed 
effects
(3)
Average peer fixed effect 0.148 0.066 0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Occupation × year effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects Yes — —
Occupation × firm effects — Yes Yes
Firm × year effects — — Yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of average peer quality on the individual log wage in the overall sample. Peer 
quality is measured as the average fixed worker effect of the coworkers in the same  three-digit occupation at the 
same firm in the same point of time. In column 1, we only control for worker fixed effects, firm fixed effects, 
 occupation-by-year fixed effects, and quadratics in age and firm tenure. We then successively add  firm-occupation 
fixed effects (column 2), and  firm-by-year fixed effects (column 3). Specification (3) corresponds to the baseline 
specification described in equation (4) in the text. Coefficients can approximately be interpreted as elasticities, and 
the coefficient of 0.011 in the baseline specification in column 3 implies that a 10 percent increase in average peer 
quality increases wages by 0.1 percent. Bootstrapped standard errors with clustering at firm level in parentheses. 
N = 12,832,842.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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of occupations with the most repetitive and predefined tasks, in which we expect 
particularly high peer pressure. These occupations also more closely resemble those 
used in earlier studies on peer pressure. The first three columns in the table refer to 
the baseline specification given by equation (4) and condition on  occupation-year, 
 firm-year, and  firm-occupation fixed effects, meaning that they correspond to speci-
fication (3) in the previous table.
For these repetitive occupations, we find a substantially larger effect of peer qual-
ity on wages than in the full sample: a 10 percent increase in peer quality raises 
wages by 0.64 percent (see column 1) compared to the effect of 0.1 percent in the 
full sample (see column 3 of Table 3). This outcome implies that a one standard devi-
ation increase in peer quality increases the wage by 0.84 percent, about one-half the 
size of the peer effects in coworker productivity identified by Mas and Moretti (2009) 
and Falk and Ichino (2006) and in the  meta-analysis by Herbst and Mas (2015).
Table 4—Peer Effects in  Subsamples of Occupations
Panel A. Peer effects for  subsamples of low-skilled occupations
 
Baseline specification of equation (4)
 Within–peer 
group estimator of 
equation (6)
5% most 
repetitive 
occupations
As in 
case 
studies
Low 
learning 
content
  5% most 
repetitive 
occupations
  (1) (2) (3)   (4)
Average peer fixed effect 0.064 0.067 0.052 0.061
(0.0070) (0.0116) (0.0031) (0.006)
Panel B. Peer effects for  subsamples of high-skilled occupations
 
Baseline specification of equation (4)
 Within–peer 
group estimator of 
equation (6)
10% most 
skilled 
occupations
10% most 
innovative 
occupations
High
 learning 
content
  10% most 
skilled 
occupations
  (1) (2) (3)   (4)
Average peer fixed effect 0.013 0.007 0.017 0.016
  (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0028)   (0.004)
Notes: The first three columns of the table replicate the baseline peer effects estimates of column 3 in Table 3 for 
different occupational groups. See online Appendix Table F.3 for a full list of occupations in each of the  subsamples 
used in this table, and Section IIIC in the text for a description of the way in which the different  subsamples were 
constructed. In panel A, column 1, we show the effect for the 5 percent most repetitive occupations. In panel A, col-
umn 2, we show the effect for agricultural helpers, cashiers and data entry workers, which have been used in related 
 case-studies on peer effects in the workplace. In panel A, column 3, we report the effect for occupations character-
ized by standardized tasks (as the 5 percent most repetitive occupations) and limited learning content (i.e., cashiers, 
warehouse workers, drivers, removal workers, cleaners, agricultural helpers, and waiters). In panel B, column 1 
we present results for the 10 percent most skilled occupations, as measured by the share of workers with a college 
degree in that occupation. In panel B, column 2 we present results for the 10 percent most innovative occupations, 
defined by occupation averages of workers’ responses to an index of how frequently they need to experiment with 
new ideas. In panel B, column 3 we present results for occupations with complex tasks and a high learning content 
(such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, teachers, and academics). In column 4, we present the within–peer group esti-
mate for, as in column 1, the 5 percent most repetitive and 10 percent most skilled occupations, see equation (6) in 
the text. The  within-estimator is based on  pre-estimated worker fixed effects from the baseline model in equation (4) 
in the text. Bootstrapped standard errors with clustering at firm level in parentheses. N = 12,832,842.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
444 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARY 2017
Column 2 of panel A shows the peer effect for the three occupations used in earlier 
studies (agricultural helpers, cashiers, and data entry workers), which is remarkably 
similar in magnitude to that for the 5 percent most repetitive occupations shown in 
column 1. Column 3 reports the results for the handpicked group of occupations 
in which we expect easily observable output and, following initial induction, lim-
ited  on-the-job learning. The estimated effect for this occupational group is slightly 
smaller than that for the 5 percent most repetitive occupations sample but still about 
five times as large as the effect for the full occupational sample.
Column 4 reports estimates using the  within–peer group estimator for the 5 per-
cent most repetitive occupations (see equation (6)). As we point out above, this 
estimator is robust to unobserved  time-varying peer group wage shocks that are 
correlated with shocks to true or estimated peer group quality. The estimated peer 
effects based on the  within–peer group specification is very close to the effect derived 
in the respective baseline specification. This similarity in estimates corroborates that 
 time-varying peer  group-specific wage shocks are not important, and provides reas-
surance that we are picking up a true peer effect rather than a spurious correlation.
High-Skilled Occupations.—In panel B of Table 4, we restrict the analysis to 
particularly high-skilled and innovative occupations with a high scope for learning, 
in which we expect knowledge spillover to be important. Yet regardless of how we 
define high-skilled occupations (columns 1 to 3), and whether or not we exploit 
variation in peer ability within peer groups only (column 4), peer effects in these 
groups are small and resemble those in the full sample. Overall, therefore, we iden-
tify sizeable peer effects in wages only in occupations characterized by standard-
ized tasks and low learning content, which are exactly the occupations in which we 
expect peer pressure to matter and which closely resemble the specific occupations 
investigated in the extant studies on peer pressure.
By looking at the 5 percent most repetitive and the 10 percent most skilled occu-
pations we have distinguished between the two extreme ends of the two indexes of 
repetitiveness and skill from which the definition of these groups was derived. In 
Figure 3 we show results from a more complete analysis that lets the peer effect 
coefficient vary by bins of these two indexes. They show a symmetric pattern, with 
highest peer effects in the most repetitive/least skilled categories, smallest peer 
effects in the middle categories, and again slightly higher but still small effects in 
the least repetitive/most skilled categories.14 The  U-shape of the estimated peer 
effects in these indexes provides support for our hypothesis that peer pressure and 
knowledge spillover are two possible mechanisms for peer effects, where the former 
operates predominantly in the most repetitive (and least skilled) occupations, while 
the latter is most pronounced in the least repetitive and most skilled occupations.
C. Timing of Effects
Figure 4 provides a first visual impression of the timing of the wage response 
to a change in peer quality in the 5 percent most repetitive occupations where peer 
14 The skill and repetitiveness indexes are strongly correlated with a correlation coefficient of −0.76. 
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effects are largest. Panels A and B show the evolutions of peer quality and residual-
ized wages (purged of the observables and fixed effects included in equation (4)) of 
peer group stayers experiencing an exceptionally large rise or fall in peer quality (of 
at least 0.055), while panel C depicts the corresponding evolutions for peer group 
movers experiencing an increase in peer quality (of at least 0.10). The figures illus-
trate that for both peer group stayers and movers, the increase (or decrease) in peer 
quality is accompanied by an immediate increase (or decrease) in wages in the same 
year, with little evidence for dynamic effects.15
We analyze the timing of peer effects more systematically in Table 5, by includ-
ing lags and leads of peer quality (computed from the estimated worker fixed effects 
from the baseline model). In column 1 of Table 5, we first augment our baseline 
model by adding the quality of a worker’s peers in two future periods (t + 1 and 
t + 2). The inclusion of future peer quality represents a placebo test, as workers 
cannot feel peer pressure or learn from colleagues whom they have not yet met. 
Reassuringly, we find that the effect of future peers is essentially zero in both repet-
itive (panel A) and high-skilled occupations (panel B), whereas the effect of current 
peers remains of the same magnitude as in our baseline specification.
In column 2 of Table 5, we add the average worker fixed effects for the peer group 
lagged by one and two periods into our baseline regression. The effects of lagged 
peer quality are informative about the mechanisms for peer effects: If peer effects are 
generated by peer pressure, then past peers should be irrelevant conditional on current 
peers in that workers should feel peer pressure only from these latter. If, on the other 
hand, peer effects result from learning, both past and current peers should  matter, 
15 It should be noted that any visual illustration of the relationship between two continuously varying variables 
(peer quality and wages) in an event study graph will necessarily select the underlying sample and reduce the sam-
ple size. For instance, workers in the most repetitive occupations who have been with the same firm for at least five 
periods, and have experienced a rise in peer quality of at least 0.055 in period zero (the “event”), are more likely 
to be in small peer groups, because the average of peer quality is more variable in small groups and thus large rises 
are more common. It should therefore not be surprising if the graphical examples slightly deviate from the overall 
estimates that use the entire sample. 
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Figure 3. Additional Heterogeneity of the Peer Effect across Bins of the Repetitive and Skilled Index
Notes: The graphs plot the peer effect across bins of the repetitiveness and the skill index. The bottom bar in panel A 
of the figure corresponds to the 5 percent most repetitive occupations used in previous tables (as in column 1, 
panel A of Table 4), and the top bar in panel B of the figure corresponds to the 10 percent most skilled occupations 
used in previous tables (as in column 1, panel B of Table 4).
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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Figure 4. Wage Variation Induced by Changes in Peer Quality (5 Percent Most Repetitive Occupations)
Notes: The figures show, for the 5 percent most repetitive occupations, the evolution of peer quality with an excep-
tionally large rise and fall in peer quality (greater than 0.055 from period −1 to period 0) on the left-hand side, 
and the corresponding evolution of residualized wages for peer group stayers (in panels A and B) in these peer 
groups on the right-hand side. Average peer quality and residualized wages are shown three periods before and two 
periods after the large change in peer quality. Panel C shows the evolution of peer quality and residualized wages 
for individuals who have moved peer group in period 0 and experienced an accompanying rise in peer quality of 
greater than 0.10, but have stayed in the same peer group in the pre and post  periods. Residualized wages have been 
obtained by a regression of the wage level on fixed effects and observables and are purged of the observables and 
fixed effects included in baseline equation (4) in the text (except for peer effects, which are not netted out). Sample 
sizes: 3,432 individuals (panel A), 326 individuals (panel B), 4,989 individuals (panel C).
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
447Cornelissen et al.: Peer effeCts in the WorkPlaCeVol. 107 no. 2
since the skills learned from a coworker should be valuable even after the worker 
or coworker has left the peer group. We find that in the repetitive sector, the average 
quality of lagged peers has almost no effect on current wages, suggesting that knowl-
edge spillover is not the primary channel of the peer effects in that sector. Relative to 
the contemporaneous effect, the lagged effects are slightly more important in skilled 
occupations (columns 2 and 3 of panel B Table 5), but overall effects continue to be 
very small. The general pattern of results that only contemporary peer quality matters 
does not change when including lags and leads jointly in column 3 of Table 5.
D. Geographically and Economically Close Workers Outside  
of the Immediate Peer Group
In Table 6, we further assess whether the quality of workers outside of the imme-
diate peer group affects wages. While providing a test of whether our peer group 
Table 5—Timing of Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Five percent most repetitive occupations
Average peer fixed effect 0.066 0.046 0.036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Average peer fixed effect, t + 1 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
Average peer fixed effect, t + 2 0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
Average peer fixed effect,  t − 1 0.0006 0.008
(0.004) (0.005)
Average peer fixed effect,  t − 2 −0.007 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005)
Observations 392,937 392,937 250,911
Panel B. Ten percent most skilled occupations
Average peer fixed effect 0.017 0.020 0.016
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Average peer fixed effect, t + 1 −0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
Average peer fixed effect, t + 2 −0.006 −0.017
(0.003) (0.007)
Average peer fixed effect,  t − 1 −0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Average peer fixed effect,  t − 2 0.008 0.012
(0.005) (0.006)
Observations 815,052 815,052 522,338
Notes: The table investigates the dynamic effects of average peer quality on log wages, based 
on  pre-estimated fixed effects from the baseline specification. Panel A shows results for the 
group of the 5 percent most repetitive occupations, as in column 1, panel A of Table 4. Panel B 
reports results for the group of the 10 percent most skilled occupations, as in column 1, 
panel B, of Table 4. In column 1 we add the peer quality of the focal worker’s future peers 
from the periods t + 1 and t + 2 to our baseline specification as a placebo test. In column 2 we 
add the average fixed effects of the lagged peer group to equation (4). In column 3 we present 
a more complete specification including both leads and lags. Bootstrapped standard errors with 
clustering at firm level in parentheses.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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definition is appropriate, the results also shed light on the potential channel of peer 
effects. In the case of peer pressure, the relevant peers are contemporaneous cowork-
ers in the immediate peer group within the firm who frequently interact and carry 
out comparable tasks, as peer pressure can only build up if workers work alongside 
each other and can observe and compare each other’s output. If, in contrast, peer 
Table 6—Other Peer Groups Inside and Outside the Firm
5% most repetitive 
occupations
10% most skilled 
occupations
    (1) (2)
Panel A. Economically close and far peer groups within the same firm
(i) Other occupation in the same firm with  above-median −0.0006 −0.0005
 closeness (“close”) (0.0009) (0.0011)
(ii) Other occupation in the same firm with below-median −0.0009 0.0007
 closeness (“far”) (0.0005) (0.0012)
(iii) “Closest” other occupation in the same firm −0.0162 0.0097
(0.0050) (0.0037)
(iv) “Farthest” other occupation in the same firm −0.020 −0.018
(0.004) (0.003)
Panel B. Economically close peer groups in other firms
(i) Average worker fixed effect of own peer group 0.0841 0.0134
(0.0034) (0.0031)
(ii) Average worker fixed effect in economically close peer −0.0012 −0.0004
 groups in other firms (0.0015) (0.0010)
(iii) Average worker fixed effect of joiners’ past peers −0.0008 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Panel C. Geographically close peers outside the firm
(i) Average worker fixed effect of own peer group 0.0758 0.0202
(0.0074) (0.0038)
(iii) Average peer fixed effect in municipality 0.0029 −0.0035
    (0.0043) (0.0033)
Notes: The table reports effects on log wages of the peer quality in peer groups that are economically or geographi-
cally close (or far) to the focal worker’s own peer group. Column 1 shows the results for the group of the 5 percent 
most repetitive occupations, as in column 1, panel A of Table 4. Column 2 reports results for the group of the 10 per-
cent most skilled occupations, as in column 1, panel B, of Table 4. In rows (i) and (ii) of panel A, we report results 
when the peer group consists of workers from a randomly chosen  three-digit occupation (other than the worker’s 
own occupation) in the same firm; distinguishing whether the randomly assigned peer group is from an economi-
cally “close” or an economically “far” occupation, where economic closeness is measured by worker flows between 
occupations in the overall sample. A pair of occupations is defined as “close” if the proportion of workers switch-
ing between these occupations is above median, and “far” if it is below median. This specification drops  firm-year 
observations with only one occupation. In rows (iii) and (iv) of panel A, we show the effect of peer quality in the 
economically closest and farthest  three-digit occupation (other than the worker’s own occupation) in the same firm, 
where closeness is again measured by worker flows between occupations in the overall sample. This specification is 
based on  firm-year observations with at least three occupations per firm. In panel B, we report results when adding 
peer quality of workers in peer groups in other firms that are economically close to the focal worker’s peer group 
to our baseline specification, where we again measure economic closeness by worker flows in the overall sample. 
In row (ii), we report the coefficient on the average worker fixed effect of workers who in year t are in peer groups 
( firm-occupation combinations) in other firms that at any point during the observation period have exchanged work-
ers with the focal worker’s peer group. In row (iii), we report the coefficient on the peer quality of the past peers of 
recent joiners to the focal worker’s peer group. For this we first identify the peer groups from which new joiners to 
the focal peer group came (i.e., the peer groups in which the joiners were in  t − 1) and compute the average worker 
fixed effect of the workers who were in these peer groups in  t − 1 but who did not join the focal peer group t. In 
panel C, we augment the baseline model by adding the average peer quality of workers living in the same munic-
ipality who are employed in the same occupation (but not necessarily in the same firm) as the focal worker. This 
equation is run on a sample for the period  1999–2010 because the indicator of the municipality of residence is only 
available from 1999. Bootstrapped standard errors with clustering at firm level in parentheses. 
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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effects result from knowledge spillover, a much wider group of peers is potentially 
relevant, since knowledge spillover is not restricted to occur within the firm only. 
In fact, knowledge spillover is often assumed to operate through interactions of 
workers who do not necessarily work in the same firm but are geographically or 
economically close (see, e.g., Lucas 1988; Moretti 2004).
In panel A of Table 6, we estimate the effects of the quality of workers in other 
occupations within the same firm on wages. In rows (i) and (ii) of panel A, we ran-
domly choose a  three-digit occupation (other than the worker’s own occupation) in 
the same firm, and distinguish whether the randomly assigned occupation is eco-
nomically close or far, as measured by observed worker flows between occupations 
in the overall sample.16 The results show that in both the repetitive and skilled sec-
tor, the quality of coworkers in other occupations within the same firm has virtually 
no impact on wages, no matter whether the occupation is close or far. We corrobo-
rate these findings in rows (iii) and (iv) of panel A, where we display the impact on 
wages of the quality of workers in the economically closest and farthest occupation 
(relative to the focal worker’s own occupation) in the same firm, again measuring 
economic closeness by observed worker flows between occupations in the overall 
sample. Overall, these findings provide strong evidence for the validity of defining 
the peer group as workers from the same  three-digit occupation in the same firm, 
and speak against knowledge spillover or peer pressure across occupations within 
the same firm.
In panel B of Table 6, we augment our baseline model by adding the quality of 
workers in other firms that are economically close (in terms of worker flows) to the 
focal worker’s peer group. First, we include the average peer fixed effect of workers 
who in year t are in peer groups ( firm-occupation combinations) in other firms that 
at any point during the observation period have exchanged workers with the focal 
worker’s peer group. Second, we identify the peer groups from which new joiners to 
the focal peer group came (i.e., the peer groups in which the joiners were in  t − 1), 
and we add the average worker fixed effect of the workers who were in these peer 
groups in  t − 1 but who did not join the focal peer group (i.e., the joiners’ past 
peers). Effects from these economically close workers in other firms are virtually 
zero, providing little evidence for knowledge spillover across peer groups in differ-
ent firms linked by worker mobility.
In panel C of Table 6 we augment our baseline model by adding the average fixed 
effect of all workers residing in the same municipality and working in the same 
occupation (but not necessarily in the same firm) as the focal worker. We find that 
peer quality in the municipality has no effect on wages, whereas the effect of peer 
quality in the firm remains unchanged.
In sum, the results in Table 6 provide little evidence of knowledge spillover or 
peer pressure from workers outside the immediate peer group. Rather, they suggest 
that peer effects in the repetitive sector are confined to the same  three-digit occupa-
tion and firm, as one would expect if peer pressure is the main driving force behind 
peer effects.
16 We define a pair of occupations as “close” if the proportion of workers switching between these occupations 
is above median, and “far” if it is below median. 
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E. Robustness Checks
As Table 7 shows, estimated peer effects remain robust to a number of alter-
native specifications for both the repetitive (column 1) and the high-skilled sector 
(column 2). As a point of reference, row (i) replicates the results from the baseline 
specification of column 1, Table 4.
As illustrated in Figure 2, our baseline specification exploits two sources of vari-
ation in peer quality: changes to the peer group  makeup as coworkers join and leave 
the group, and moves to new peer groups by the focal worker. Unlike the latter, the 
former controls for the presence of  time-constant match-specific effects  m ioj that 
are correlated with peer ability (as first differencing eliminates these for peer group 
stayers, but not for peer group movers). Rows (ii) and (iii) show that both sources of 
variation lead to very similar peer effects, indicating that our baseline peer estimates 
are not biased because of  match-specific shocks.17
In row (iv), we report results when the censored wage observations are not 
imputed. In row (v), we relax the assumption that observable characteristics have the 
same effects in repetitive occupations and high-skilled occupations. In row (vi), we 
extend our estimation sample to include not only the metropolitan area of Munich, 
but also additional surrounding rural areas. In row (vii), we add to the regression 
the average observed characteristics (firm tenure, age, and schooling) of peers. In 
rows (viii) and (ix), we display peer effect estimates separately for small (≤ 10) 
and large (> 100) peer groups.18 Remarkably, for both repetitive and high-skilled 
occupations, all these different specifications yield similar estimates as the baseline 
estimates reported in Table 4.
The evidence presented in panel A of Table 6 suggests that workers rarely interact 
with coworkers outside the same  three-digit occupation in the firm, supporting the 
definition of the peer group as workers from the same  three-digit occupation, rather 
than the same two- or  one-digit occupation, in the same firm. In row (x) of Table 7, 
we display peer effect estimates for a narrower peer group definition where we split 
peer groups at the  three-digit occupational level further up into two age groups 
(above and below median age). Interestingly, the peer effect drops by more than 
50 percent, which is in line with the hypothesis that the exclusion of relevant peers 
from the peer group leads to an attenuation bias. Overall, this drop, in  conjunction 
with the findings in panel A of Table 6, suggests that our baseline peer group defini-
tion at the  three-digit occupational level is the most plausible.19
17 This is in line with Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) and Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016), who show that 
once firm fixed effects are accounted for,  match-specific effects are not an important determinant of worker mobility. 
18 In online Appendix Table F.4, we display estimates for finer peer group size and firm size categories. The 
estimates are very similar across the different categories of peer group and firm sizes for both most repetitive and 
high-skilled occupations. 
19 As a further robustness check, we have instrumented, for the 5 percent most repetitive occupations, the 
change in peer quality by the average quality of leavers from the peer group who in  t − 1 were close to retirement 
age; the rationale being that leaving into retirement may be more exogenous than other reasons for the turnover of 
peers. This gives us a strong first stage ( F-value 151.1) with expected negative sign. The IV peer effect coefficient is 
0.041, not too far off our baseline estimate of 0.064, although imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant; 
see Table F.5 in the online Appendix. 
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F. Heterogeneous Peer Effects
We now provide additional evidence that peer effects in the 5 percent most repet-
itive occupations—where we have found the strongest effects—are driven primarily 
by peer pressure, by investigating heterogeneity in peer effects in that sector.
Age and Job Tenure.—In the low-skilled, repetitive occupations we consider, 
we expect that almost all the  on-the-job learning takes place when workers are 
young or have only just joined the peer group. In panel A of Table 8, we there-
fore allow the peer effect in the 5 percent most repetitive occupations to differ for 
older (age >35 years) and younger workers (age ≤35 years) and for workers who 
Table 7—Robustness Checks
5% most repetitive 
occupations
10% most skilled 
occupations
    (1) (2)
(i) Baseline 0.064 0.013
(0.0070) (0.0039)
(ii) Separate effect for stayers 0.061 0.014
(0.006) (0.003)
(iii) Separate effect for movers 0.073 0.006
(0.006) (0.004)
(iv) Wage not imputed 0.086 0.017
(0.007) (0.007)
(v) Varying coefficients on observables 0.082 0.007
(0.008) (0.004)
(vi) Expansion of sample to larger region 0.082 0.014
 with additional rural areas (0.008) (0.002)
(vii) Include peer observables 0.071 0.010
(0.006) (0.005)
(viii) Peer groups size ≤10 0.068 0.014
(0.002) (0.001)
(ix) Peer groups size >100 0.081 0.014
(0.004) (0.003)
(x) Peer group defined by age groups within 0.032 0.006
 three-digit occupations (0.007) (0.004)
Notes: The table reports a number of robustness checks for the effect of average peer quality on 
log wages. The first column refers to the group of the 5 percent most repetitive occupations and 
the second column refers to the group of the 10 percent most skilled occupations. For compar-
ison, we replicate the results from the respective baseline specifications of column 1, Table 4 
in row (i). In rows (ii) and (iii), we show separate peer effects for stayers and movers. Workers 
are defined as stayers in periods when they are in the same firm and occupation in period t as 
in period  t − 1, and as movers when they switch the firm or occupation between periods  t − 1 
and t. In row (iv), we do not impute censored wage observations. In row (v), we allow the coef-
ficients on the observable characteristics (quadratics in age and firm tenure) to vary between 
the 5 percent most repetitive (or 10 percent most skilled) occupations and the remaining occu-
pations. In row (vi) we extend our estimation sample to include not only the metropolitan area 
of Munich, but also additional surrounding rural areas. In row (vii), we augment the baseline 
model by adding peer averages of observed characteristics (firm tenure, age, and schooling). 
In rows (viii) and (ix), we report the peer effect coefficient for small and large peer groups 
respectively. In row (x), we report results for an alternative narrower peer group definition at 
the  three-digit-occupation-age-firm level. Bootstrapped standard errors with clustering at firm 
level in parentheses. N = 12,832,842.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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have been with the peer group for more or less than two years. Although we do 
find that peer effects are larger for younger workers, which is in line with knowl-
edge spillover, we also find positive peer effects for older workers. Moreover, peer 
effects vary little with tenure in the peer group. Both these findings are difficult 
to reconcile with peer effects arising from knowledge spillover alone. It should 
also be noted that although the smaller peer effect for older workers is consistent 
with knowledge spillover, it is also in line with younger workers responding more 
strongly to peer pressure or suffering more from the “pain” of peer pressure than 
older or more experienced workers.
Symmetry of Effects.—In panel B of Table 8 we investigate whether improve-
ments in the average peer group quality have similar effects as deteriorations. To this 
Table 8—Heterogeneous Peer Effects (5% Most Repetitive Occupations)
Panel A. Heterogeneous effects by age and peer group tenure
Age ≤ 35 years Age > 35 years
Average peer fixed effect 0.081 0.053
(0.005) (0.005)
Peer group tenure < 2 Peer group tenure ≥ 2
Average peer fixed effect 0.058 0.066
(0.007) (0.006)
Panel B. Symmetry of peer effects (first differences, peer group stayers,  pre-estimated effects)
Negative change Positive change
Change in average peer fixed effect 0.055 0.048
(0.010) (0.008)
Panel C. Heterogeneous effects by relative position within the peer group
Focal worker 
below median
Focal worker
above median
Average peer fixed effect 0.066 0.032
(0.006) (0.006)
Panel D. Distinguishing between top versus bottom peers ( pre-estimated)
Top versus bottom peers
Average fixed effect of middle 80% peers 0.072
(0.0045)
Average fixed effect of top 10% of peers 0.004
(0.0018)
Average fixed effect of bottom 10% of peers 0.007
(0.0017)
Notes: The table investigates possible heterogeneous effects of peer quality in the 5 percent most repetitive sector. 
In panel A we allow the effect of average peer quality on log wages to differ between workers below and above 
age 35, and between workers who have been in the peer group more and less than two years. In panel B we inves-
tigate whether improvements and deteriorations in average peer quality have similarly sized effects. To do this, we 
adopt an approach similar to Mas and Moretti (2009) and regress, for peer group stayers, the change in log wages 
on the change in peer group quality (using the  pre-estimated worker fixed effects from our baseline specification), 
and allow this effect to vary according to whether peer group quality improved or deteriorated. In panel C we let the 
peer effect vary by whether the focal worker is above or below the  peer-group mean of ability (as measured by the 
 pre-estimated worker fixed effects from the baseline model). In panel D, we split the worker’s peers up into the mid-
dle 80 percent, top 10 percent, and bottom 10 percent according to their ability ranking. This specification is again 
based on  pre-estimated worker fixed effects, and is run on the sample for the middle 80 percent of workers only.
Source: German social security data, one large local labor market,  1989–2005
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end, using the peer group stayers, we regress the change in log wages on the change 
in peer group quality (using the  pre-estimated worker fixed effects from our baseline 
specification) and allow this effect to vary according to whether peer group quality 
improves or deteriorates (see Mas and Moretti 2009, for a similar specification). 
Our results show relatively symmetric effects for both improvements and deterio-
rations. This once again points against knowledge spillover as the primary driver 
behind peer effects in the repetitive sector, as it is unlikely that workers immediately 
“unlearn” skills when peers get worse.
Low- versus High-Ability Workers.—In panel C of Table 8, we explore whether the 
peer effects in wages differ for low- versus high-ability workers in the peer group (i.e., 
workers with a worker fixed effect,  pre-estimated from our baseline specification, 
below and above the median in the  firm-occupation). Like Mas and Moretti (2009), 
we find that peer effects are almost twice as large for low- as for high-ability workers. 
One possible explanation is that low-ability workers increase their effort more than 
high-ability workers in response to an increase in peer quality (i.e., the peer effect in 
productivity is higher for low- than for high-ability workers). If this latter does indeed 
explain peer effect differences between low- and high-ability workers, then, as Mas 
and Moretti (2009) emphasize, firms may want to increase peer group diversity—and 
maximize productivity—by grouping low-ability with high-ability workers.
Our model, however, also suggests an alternative interpretation; namely, that 
low-ability workers suffer more from the pain of peer pressure than high-ability 
workers, leading to higher peer effects in wages for low- than high-ability workers, 
even when peer effects in productivity are the same.20 If such “pain” is the reason 
for the larger peer effects among the low-ability workers, then firms may prefer 
homogeneous peer groups over diverse peer groups because they will save wage 
costs without lowering productivity.
Bottom versus Top Peers.—Whereas all our previous specifications estimate the 
effect of average peer quality on wages, in panel D of Table 8, we estimate the effect 
of the quality of the top and bottom workers in the peer group on wages. To do so, 
we split the peer group into three groups: the top 10 percent, the middle 80 percent, 
and the bottom 10 percent of peers based on the estimated worker fixed effects from 
our baseline regression.21 We then regress individual wages on the average worker 
fixed effect for the three groups, controlling for the same covariates and fixed effects 
as in our baseline specification and restricting the sample to workers in the middle 
group. We find that the effect of the average peer quality in the middle group on 
wages is similar to our baseline effect, while the average productivities of peers in 
20 In our model, low- and high-ability workers increase their effort by the same amount in response to an increase 
in peer ability (see online Appendix equation (A.2)), meaning that the peer effect in productivity is the same for 
both groups. Note, however, that the rate at which higher peer ability translates into “pain” from peer pressure, 
 
∂ P ( e i ,  _ y~i )  _______∂  _ y~i  =  λ P (m −  e i ⁎ ) varies inversely with a worker’s own optimal effort  e i ⁎ , which in turn varies positively 
with individual ability (see online Appendix equation (A.4)), implying that the pain from peer pressure for a given 
increase in peer ability is higher for low-ability than for high-ability workers. 
21 Although these shares are quite exact in large peer groups, in small peer groups, the top and bottom do not 
exactly equal 10 percent. For example, in a peer group with four workers, one worker falls at the top, one at the 
bottom, and two in the middle. 
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the bottom or top groups have no significant effect on wages. Hence, our baseline 
peer effects are neither driven entirely by very bad workers nor driven entirely by 
very good workers. This observation rules out a simple chain production model in 
which team productivity is determined by the productivity of the “weakest link in 
the chain”; that is, the least productive worker. It also suggests that the peer effects 
in the 5 percent most repetitive occupations are not driven solely by the most pro-
ductive workers in the peer group, even though these latter may increase overall peer 
group productivity by motivating and guiding their coworkers.22
V. Conclusions
Although peer effects in the classroom have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature (see Sacerdote 2011, for an overview), empirical evidence on peer effects in 
coworker productivity is as yet restricted to a handful of studies based on either lab-
oratory experiments or  real-world data from a single firm or occupation. Our study 
sheds light on the external validity of these studies by carrying out the first investi-
gation to date into peer effects in a general workplace setting. Unlike the previous 
research, our study focuses on peer effects in wages rather than in productivity.
On average we find only small, albeit precisely estimated, peer effects in wages, 
suggesting that the larger peer effects found in existing studies may not carry over 
to the labor market in general. Yet our results also reveal larger peer effects in low-
skilled occupations where coworkers can easily observe each other’s output, which 
are exactly the occupations most often analyzed in the previous studies on peer pres-
sure. In these types of occupations, therefore, the findings of previous studies extend 
beyond the specific firms or tasks which they explore. Our results also indicate that 
in this segment of the labor market, productivity spillovers translate into wage spill-
overs—a dynamic as yet unexplored in the literature—and suggest that indeed peer 
pressure, and not knowledge spillover, is the main source of the peer effect.
Overall, we conclude that peer effects in the workplace, despite being important 
in some specific settings, do not importantly affect the wage setting of firms, nor do 
they contribute significantly to overall inequality in the labor market.
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